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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
GARNER V. STATE: THE UNIT OF PROSECUTION FOR USE
OF A HANDGUN IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME OF
VIOLENCE IS THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE, NOT THE VICTIM
OR
CRIMINAL
TRANSACTION;
THE
EVIDENCE
CORROBORATED
TWO
SEPARATE
HANDGUN
CONVICTIONS; AND THE TRIAL COURT’S ONE-YEAR
SENTENCE FOR THE SECOND USE OF A HANDGUN
CONVICTION WAS ILLEGAL.
By: Ashlyn J. Campos
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the unit of prosecution for
Section 4-204 of the Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article (“section 4-204”)
is the individual crime of violence, not the victim or criminal transaction.
Garner v. State, 442 Md. 226, 230, 112 A.3d 392, 394 (2015). The court of
appeals further held that separate handgun convictions are permitted when
evidence supports multiple crimes or felonies. Id. at 244, 112 A.3d at 402.
Finally, the court held that a trial court does not possess the discretion to
impose a sentence less than the mandatory five year minimum prescribed by
section 4-204 of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”). Id. at 250-52, 112 A.3d at
406-08.
On December 18, 2010, Terrance Garner (“Garner”) attempted to rob Ben
WaBeya (“WaBeya”) at gunpoint. When WaBeya did not comply with
Garner’s demands, Garner shot him twelve times in the legs and stomach area.
Garner then stood over WaBeya and discharged a final shot into WaBeya’s
neck.
Garner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and sentenced
to thirty years imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder, twenty years
to be served consecutively for one count of use of a handgun in the commission
of a crime of violence, fifteen years to be served concurrently for attempted
robbery with a dangerous weapon, and a consecutive one year sentence for the
second count of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.
Garner appealed and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed
the circuit court, holding that separate consecutive sentences for Garner’s use
of a handgun convictions were legal. The court of special appeals judicially
noted that it was not illegal to impose a one-year sentence for a violation of
section 4-204 under the plain language of the statute. Garner petitioned for a
writ of certiorari and the State conditionally cross-petitioned to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland. The court granted both petitions.
The court of appeals first addressed Garner’s contention that the unit of
prosecution for a violation of section 4-204 is the victim of the crime of
violence or the criminal transaction. Garner, 442 Md. at 235, 112 A.3d at 397.
To ascertain the proper statutorily prescribed unit of prosecution, the court
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looked to the legislative intent of the statute. Id. at 236-38, 112 A.3d at 397400. Legislative intent is clarified through applying the general rules of
statutory interpretation, which begin with an evaluation of the plain language
and meaning of the statute and a review of the statutory history. Id. at 236-37,
112 A.3d at 398. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, no further
analysis is warranted. Id. at 237, 112 A.3d at 398 (citing State v. Weems, 429
Md. 329, 337, 55 A.3d 921, 926 (2012)).
Section 4-204 provides that “a person may not use a firearm in the
commission of a crime of violence... or any felony.” Garner, 442 Md. at 238,
112 A.3d at 399 (citing CL § 4-204). The court found the plain language to
be clear and unambiguous. Id. at 242, 112 A.3d 401. However, the “plain
language must be read within the context of the statutory scheme” and the
court will not ignore signs that the plain language conflicts with the “purpose,
aim, or policies” the drafters intended. Id. at 237, 112 A.3d at 398 (citing
Weems, 429 Md. at 337, 55 A.3d at 926).
To ensure the legislative intent and purpose of the statute were correctly
interpreted, the court reviewed the statutory history. Garner, 442 Md. at 237,
112 A.3d at 398. Prior to the enactment of section 4-204, Art. 27, § 36B(d)
(“Art. 27”) was the governing statute for use of a handgun offenses. Id. at
238-39, 112 A.3d at 399. In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
concluded that the unit of prosecution for Art. 27 was the crime of violence or
felony committed with a handgun. Id. at 239, 112 A.3d at 399. (citing Brown
v. State, 311 Md. 426, 434-35, 53 A.2d 482, 486 (1988)). The Brown court
opined that the victim and the criminal transaction were irrelevant factors in
determining the unit of prosecution for Art. 27. Id. at 239-40, 112 A.3d at
399-400. (citing Brown, 311 Md. at 434-35, 53 A.2d at 486). The Garner court
found no reason to believe that the legislature intended section 4-204 to be
interpreted differently than Art. 27. Id. at 240-41, 112 A.3d at 401.
After reviewing the legislative history and examining the plain language of
section 4-204, the court of appeals concluded that the statute criminalizes
using a handgun during every felony or crime of violence. Garner, 442 Md.
at 242-43, 112 A.3d at 401-02. Thus, the proper unit of prosecution for a
violation of section 4-204 is the crime of violence committed with a handgun.
Id. Additionally, as long as there is evidence of multiple crimes of violence
and evidence that each of those crimes is committed with a handgun, each
crime of violence will sustain its own distinct handgun conviction. Id. at 24344, 112 A.3d at 402-03.
Next, the court addressed Garner’s alternative argument that under the
court’s prior decision in Johnson v. State, either the rule of lenity, the required
evidence test, or the principle of fundamental fairness mandated separate
handgun sentences to be merged. Garner, 442 Md. at 246, 112 A.3d at 404.
The court, however, was unpersuaded that merger is required under the rule of
lenity. In Johnson, the statute that regulated sentencing for a use of a handgun
offense was ambiguously written and has since been superseded. Id. (citing
Johnson v. State, 56 Md. App. 205, 219, 467 A.2d 544, 550-51(1983)). The
court further concluded that merger is not required under the required evidence
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test or the principle of fundamental fairness because the two handgun
convictions are not “part and parcel” of each other and the elements of the
underlying crimes attached to the convictions are unrelated. Id. at 249-50, 112
A.3d at 406.
Finally, the court addressed the State’s argument that a one-year sentence
for a use of a handgun conviction was illegal. Garner, 442 Md. at 250, 112
A.3d at 406. Pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345(a), “the court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time,” including on appeal. Id. at 250-51, 112 A.3d at 406.
Section 4-204(c) provides that a person convicted for use of a handgun in the
commission of a crime of violence “shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
not less than 5 years.” Id. at 252, 112 A.3d at 407. Therefore, the imposition
of a one-year sentence was illegal because it is less than the mandatory
minimum prescribed by the statute. Id.
In Garner, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a violation of section
4-204 permits separate consecutive sentences, the unit of prosecution is the
crime of violence, and the mandatory minimum sentencing clause is a hardfloor component of the statute. The court’s decision significantly empowers
prosecutors in plea-bargaining, because they will be able to utilize the statute’s
mandatory five-year sentence as leverage over the defendant. This decision
also advances society’s interest against gun violence, given that no sentencing
leniency will be afforded to defendants who are convicted of handgun crimes.
Furthermore, this decision may discourage practitioners from presenting
merger arguments because the Garner court found no merit in the three rules
that require merger of sentences. With the enactment of section 4-204, it is
clear that the courts will be punishing handgun crimes to their fullest extent.

